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Donald Trump’s aggressive policy towards Beijing and the spectre of a trade war have served 
as a catalyst for the resumption of dialogue between China and the EU. Within a period of less 
than two weeks, the Chinese prime minister held three meetings with EU leaders: within the 
16+1 framework, a German-Chinese intergovernmental consultation, and a China-EU summit. 
Beijing’s diplomatic offensive was intended to show openness to the EU’s demands to liberal-
ise access to the Chinese market, and to neutralise allegations that China has been exploiting 
divisions between EU member states. Beijing hopes that improving the climate of the talks, 
together with making some small concessions to Brussels, and especially to Berlin, will allow 
it to bring the EU onto its side in its conflict with the United States at relatively little cost. This 
puts the EU in a dilemma. On the one hand, supporting the pressure Washington is currently 
putting on Beijing could lead to a real opening-up of the Chinese market, and also reduce 
the growing imbalance in international trade whose roots lie in China. However, this risks 
a collapse of economic growth in China, which would mean losses for many European compa-
nies. On the other hand, if the EU cooperated with Beijing on this matter, it could strengthen 
the multilateral trading system based on the WTO, and also help to defend the Iran agree-
ment and the Paris agreement on climate change. However, if Brussels openly joins the Chi-
nese coalition against Washington, that could cause serious divisions within the EU and in 
trans-Atlantic relations, and also limit Beijing’s determination to undertake domestic reforms.
The economic conflict between China and the 
United States has revived the concepts China 
has operated under since the beginning of the 
21st century, according to which the formation 
of an alliance with the EU would allow China to 
counteract the dominance of the United States. 
However, the series of internal crises the EU 
has undergone since 2010, including the debt 
crisis in the euro area, the migration crisis and 
Brexit, has disseminated the conviction within 
China that the community is suffering from in-
ternal weakness and diminished the belief that 
it could be helpful in balancing the power of the 
United States. Currently China mainly sees the 
EU as a sales market and a source of advanced 
technology. Beijing’s policy is focused on main-
taining the beneficial status quo of asymmetri-
cally opening the EU up to Chinese exports and 
taking over European companies. This has man-
ifested itself, on the one hand, in a reluctance 
to renegotiate the legal basis of the two sides’ 
economic contacts (including bilateral invest-
ment treaties [BITs]), and on the other, in pre-
venting European attempts to close their mar-
ket, including during the dispute over granting 
China market economy status within the WTO1. 
1 See J. Jakóbowski, M. Kaczmarski, The EU on granting China 
market economy status: a compromise or a dodge?, “OSW 
Commentary”, 5 August 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-08-05/eu-granting-
china-market-economy-status-a-compromise-or-a-dodge
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The primary instrument of Beijing’s policy of 
‘divide and conquer’ in the EU in recent years 
has been the implementation of bilateral rela-
tions, above all with the three member states 
considered to be regional powers (Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom), as well as within 
the regional 16+1 format.
For the EU, China has in recent years become an 
increasingly important economic partner, but 
also an increasingly dangerous competitor. The 
global financial crisis, followed by the euro-area 
crisis, has led to years of economic stagnation 
in many of the EU member states. The rapidly 
growing Chinese market has become a source 
of diversification2 in revenue for major EU ex-
porters, such as Germany. Over time, howev-
er, it has turned out that the intensification of 
the economic relationship with China has had 
a high price. The Chinese authorities, despite 
their promises, have not guaranteed European 
investors and exporters access to their market 
in a way comparable to the EU’s openness, and 
have even imposed new restrictions in some 
branches3. At the same time, Chinese compa-
nies have begun to catch up technologically 
with some of the European champions. This has 
happened mainly because Beijing has been run-
ning its industrial policy on two different tracks. 
For certain branches, entry onto the lucrative 
Chinese market is conditional upon foreign in-
2 At this point we may even talk in terms of dependency, as 
the 30 biggest German listed companies receive 15% of 
their income from the Chinese market. Volkswagen sells 
37% of its finished cars there, BMW 24% and Daimler 23%.
3 This mainly applies to the high-tech sectors. The Chinese 
law on cyber-security introduced in 2017 increases Ger-
man concerns regarding the leakage of knowledge from 
foreign companies operating on the Chinese market.
vestors creating joint ventures and transferring 
technology to their Chinese partners4. At the 
same time, Beijing provides almost unlimited 
funding for the foreign expansion of Chinese 
entities, which has opened up the way for many 
of them to buy up their European competitors 
and the attractive technologies they own. In 
accordance with the Chinese government’s 
‘Made in China 2025’ strategy, this support 
covers the most promising branches (including 
robotics, renewable energy, modern transport), 
on which the long-term competitiveness of the 
European economy is largely based. 
In the face of trade war with the United States, 
as well as growing risk of a revision of the WTO’s 
rules, China is threatened not only with losing 
access to the American market and technology 
(which from the Chinese perspective increas-
es the importance of the EU’s openness), but 
also the dismantling of the multilateral global 
trading system which has underpinned Chi-
na’s economic success. The Chinese response 
to Trump’s policy is an attempt to cast itself as 
the main defender of free trade, together with 
the creation of an international coalition for 
openness, of which the expanding Belt & Road 
Initiative (a.k.a. the New Silk Road) is the main 
platform among developing countries. To stand 
up to the US, however, Beijing needs partners 
from the EU, which have the appropriate eco-
nomic power to shape the rules of global trade. 
During July’s meetings with the prime minis-
ters of Central and Eastern European countries, 
the bilateral Chinese-German consultations, 
and then the official China-EU summit held in 
Beijing, China put forward its offer of a new 
opening in its relations with Europe, in the hope 
of getting the EU’s support for its trade policy.
4 In addition, foreign investors are exposed to technology 
theft by Chinese competitors due to the low level of in-
tellectual property protection in China.
Beijing’s policy is focused on maintaining 
the asymmetrical openness of the EU to 
Chinese exports and investment.
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The 16+1 summit in Sofia: altering  
the format to suit Brussels and Berlin
Beijing’s aim regarding the summit of the 16+1 
format (gathering together China and sixteen 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe), 
which was held on 6-7 July in Sofia, was pri-
marily to weaken the controversy which this 
grouping has caused among Western Europe-
an countries. China moved this year’s summit 
(which had previously been held in the last 
quarter of the year) to an earlier date to fit in 
with the timetable of its other meetings with 
the EU. Beijing also went one step further in the 
rhetoric it has employed over the past several 
years by presenting the 16+1 as an element of 
its cooperation with the EU, announcing that it 
would adapt its offers for financing infrastruc-
ture to EU regulations. This was done in order 
to calm the fears of EU institutions, which see 
the 16+1 format as crossing the line into areas 
reserved for formal EU-Chinese dialogue, and 
have criticised the Chinese offer of finance as 
failing to comply with EU regulations concern-
ing tenders and state aid. Germany also has 
serious concerns that the frequent meetings 
of leaders within the 16+1 format represent an 
attempt to pull the Central and Eastern Europe-
an region into the zone of China’s political and 
economic influence, which would undermine 
the competitiveness of the German economy5. 
This format has been described in terms such 
as ‘a dangerous parallel network of institu-
tions’ which undermines the coherence of the 
EU6. After a campaign in Chinese state media 
during 2017 criticising the German position7, 
Beijing adopted a more conciliatory position in 
5 For Germany the Visegrad states themselves – taken 
in total – are the largest trading partner, with a turnover 
of €273 billion, while China, which ranks second, gener-
ates turnover amounting to ‘only’ €187 billion.
6 W. Wu, Berlin uneasy about Beijing’s growing clout in 
eastern, southern Europe, “South China Morning Post”, 
18 February 2017, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/
diplomacy-defence/article/2072046/berlin-uneasy-
about-beijings-growing-clout-eastern
7 Cui Hongjian, Dreams of ‘one Europe‘ need the actions 
to match, “The Global Times”, 6 September 2017.
2018, and has begun to deal with Germany’s 
concerns directly. The future of the format has 
been discussed at meetings including the bilat-
eral consultations held in May this year, when 
China invited German companies to participate 
in projects within the 16+1 format, and has also 
proposed Germany’s formal inclusion in the 
16+1 group.
At the Sofia summit, the Chinese also made an 
offer to the countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope in the hope that they would support their 
global agenda. Although some participants in 
the format (including Hungary) have adopted 
the strategy of promoting China’s interests in 
anticipation of bilateral economic benefits, oth-
er countries are trying to use the 16+1 format 
to communicate to China the need to find solu-
tions to the long-term problems in its relations 
with the region. In the document issued after 
the summit, Beijing’s previous demand con-
cerning the use of China’s Exim Bank’s line of 
credit, which most of the sixteen states did not 
consider to be sufficiently financially attractive, 
has been replaced by a passage on the need 
to look for ‘innovations in the mode of invest-
ment and financing’. In Sofia a special research 
institute is to be set up, tasked with the mission 
of adapting the activities of Chinese companies 
to EU regulations. The region’s key demands in-
clude expanding access to the Chinese market 
and reducing the trade deficit. In response to 
this, Beijing has proposed to the 16+1 states 
that it will create a set of instruments to pro-
mote exports of their foodstuffs to China (in-
cluding the creation of exhibition centres for 
their food products in China), and that it will 
expand channels for e-commerce distribution. 
The Chinese response to Trump’s policy 
is an attempt to cast itself as the main 
defender of free trade and create an inter-
national coalition for openness.
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However, the Chinese offer to Central and 
Eastern Europe is still at the declarative stage, 
and during the course of the summit no bi-
lateral agreements with the countries of the 
region which would have been relevant from 
the economic point of view were signed. 
China’s position in Sofia should be seen as 
expressing a willingness to open dialogue on 
adapting the 16+1 to Brussels expectations, 
including greater flexibility in the financing 
and construction of infrastructure, as well 
as a to accommodate some of the interests 
of the Central and Eastern European states. 
This opens the way for institutional cooperation 
with the EU, including the creation of invest-
ment funds and credit lines aimed at the devel-
opment of the region. The question remains as 
to whether the scope of the concessions provid-
ed by Beijing will satisfy the EU institutions and 
Germany. In March this year Brussels signalled 
that it expected a reduction in the frequency 
of 16+1 summits8; however, in Sofia, the Prime 
Minister of Croatia Andrej Plenković announced 
that his country had agreed to host the sum-
mit next year9. As was shown by the confer-
ence after the intergovernmental consultation 
in Berlin, during which China’s prime minister 
defended the functioning of the 16+1, Beijing 
is not at present ready to make concessions or 
marginalise the format.
8 N. Barkin, R. Emott, T. Tsolova, Exclusive: China may pare 








an offer to German companies
One of the most important events affecting the 
positive course of the EU-China summit was the 
German-Chinese intergovernmental consulta-
tions, which had been held a week before then. 
The meeting of both countries’ governments, 
the fifth in the last eight years, saw the signing 
of 22 contracts worth US$30 billion. The atmos-
phere during these talks was significantly dif-
ferent from that prevailing in previous years10. 
After the initial enthusiasm that accompanied 
the meetings in this format, a sense of disap-
pointment at them had prevailed in Germany 
in recent years.
During the last two years, an integral part of 
the talks was German government representa-
tives’ criticism of Beijing for its lack of reciproc-
ity regarding market access, as well as its policy 
of buying up shares in German small and me-
dium-sized enterprises in order to acquire their 
technology. This time, though, the Chinese gov-
ernment offered to take concrete steps towards 
liberalising access to their domestic market. 
In April the Chinese government promised that 
by 2022 it would abolish the requirement to 
create partnerships with at least 50% partici-
pation by a partner from China with regard to 
the activities of foreign investors in the auto-
motive industry. According to the declaration 
in July by Prime Minister Li Keqiang, Germa-
ny’s BMW will be the first foreign automotive 
company to obtain a majority stake (75%) in 
a joint venture created in China11. During the 
Chinese-German talks, an agreement was 
10 As a result of the Chinese-German talks, Liu Xia, the wife 
of the deceased Chinese dissident and Nobel Prize win-
ner Liu Xiaobo, who had been held under house arrest, 
was released from China to Europe. Beijing’s decision 
was a symbolic gesture towards Germany, which had 
hitherto belonged to the ranks of countries unsuccess-
fully demanding the release of Chinese prisoners.
11 D. Ren, China makes the BMW the envy of foreign carmak-
ers, giving it green light to raise its venture stake, South 
China Morning Post, 16 July 2018, https://www.scmp.com/
business/companies/article/2155528/china-makes-bmw-
envy-foreign-carmakers-giving-it-green-light
Beijing’s aim regarding the 16+1 summit 
in Sofia was primarily to weaken the con-
troversy which this grouping has caused 
among Western European countries.
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also signed under which BASF will be able to 
build a production plant in China valued at 
US$10 billion without the need for cooperation 
with a Chinese partner (the German company 
had previously operated a joint venture with 
the Chinese company Sinopec). These steps by 
Beijing are clearly a nod towards German busi-
ness, and represent one of the first real sig-
nals of changes in the long-term policy of the 
Chinese government, which accepted the entry 
of foreign companies in strategic sectors pro-
vided they shared their technology with their 
partners in China. Representatives of the Ger-
man Chamber of Commerce and Industry wel-
comed the steps taken by the government in 
Beijing to open up its domestic market, espe-
cially in the areas of financial services, the auto-
motive, aerospace and shipbuilding industries. 
However, they emphasised that this is just the 
beginning of the journey to the destination, 
that is, equality of conditions for EU companies 
operating in China with the terms the European 
market offers to Chinese companies.
A new element in the relationship may come 
from technological cooperation in the devel-
opment of the automotive industry. German 
companies have had problems with mastering 
key new technologies, such as the production 
of batteries for electric cars, as well as software 
for self-driving vehicles. During the intergovern-
mental consultations, the construction of a Chi-
nese battery factory in Thuringia for BMW cars 
was announced. As Chancellor Angela Merkel 
stated, German manufacturers must make use 
of deliveries of electric car batteries from Asian 
companies, because they themselves are un-
able to produce them at a competitive price. 
In addition, the two countries’ ministers of econ-
omy signed an agreement on cooperation in the 
development of self-driving vehicle technology. 
It was announced that BMW will join the work 
by the Chinese company Baidu on software to 
drive self-driving cars, namely the Apollo system, 
which is the main competitor to the Waymo sys-
tem currently being developed by Google.
Many important issues have been pushed into 
the background, including in particular the 
question of the transferral of German technol-
ogy12. Attempts to stop this trend by tighten-
ing the law on takeovers of companies which 
are essential for German security have been 
only partially successful. Chinese investors’ in-
terest in taking over German companies has 
continued, although the expansion of capital 
from China has fallen off in other EU countries. 
In the first half of this year, Chinese companies 
acquired shares in EU businesses to the tune of 
€15 billion (a decrease of 47%), of which €10 bil-
lion was accounted for by Germany (an increase 
of 47%). It has been difficult for the German 
government to draw up regulations protecting 
its strategic interests while at the same time 
not limiting the rules on the free movement of 
capital within the EU. This year, the acquisition 
of a 20% stake in the energy infrastructure op-
erator 50Hertz by a company from China only 
failed to go through due to the reluctance of 
one of the private company’s owners to resell 
the shares13. In February this year, Li Shufu, the 
founder and chairman of the leading Chinese 
automotive company Geely (which controls Swe-
den’s Volvo) became one of the main sharehold-
ers in Daimler (taking almost 10% of the shares). 
12 This problem was noted in Germany in 2015, when despite 
opposition from German politicians the Chinese took over 
Kuka, the German leader in robotics. See K. Popławski, 
Capital does have nationality: Germany’s fears of Chi-




13 K. Popławski, Germany: new barriers for Chinese capi-
tal, “OSW Analyses”, 8 August 2018, https://www.osw. 
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2018-08-08/germa-
ny-new-barriers-chinese-capital
Beijing’s main aims were to ease the criti-
cism levelled against it by Berlin, and to get 
a signal from Germany that it was opposed 
to Trump’s trade policy.
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The Chinese company carried out the transac-
tion by exploiting legal and financial loopholes, 
circumventing German law imposing the obli-
gation to publish information about its assets, 
and it also failed to inform the management of 
Daimler of this fact14. These acquisitions have 
caused concerns in Germany within the context 
of the Chinese government’s ‘Made in China 
2025’ strategy, which assumes that manufac-
turers from China will achieve leading positions 
in many industries where Germany is currently 
the world leader. Moreover, the law introduced 
by China in 2017 on cyber-security may lead to 
an increase in leakages of data and technolo-
gy from German companies, including highly 
advanced technology, from their production 
plants located in China. These concerns are all 
the more justified in that the most important 
German companies have been considering the 
construction of R&D centres in China. 
Beijing’s main aims were to ease the criticism 
levelled against it by Berlin, and to get a sig-
nal from Germany that the latter was opposed 
to Trump’s trade policy. These aims had only 
partial success because Germany only agreed 
to a general statement of both countries’ com-
mitment to multilateralism and the rules of the 
World Trade Organisation. At the same time, 
by removing the requirement to create a joint 
venture for the individual German companies, 
China has neutralised the criticism from Germa-
ny of its lack of reciprocity in granting market 
access in EU-Chinese relations.
14 A. Jourdan, N. Shirouzu, How Geely’s Li Shufu spent 
months stealthily building a $9 billion stake in Daimler, 




The EU-China summit:  
open dialogue without a common front
The EU-China summit on 16-17 July was a test 
of the effectiveness of China’s new strategy of 
offering concessions to the EU. Beijing’s rela-
tions with Brussels have cooled notably in re-
cent years, mainly due to the lack of response 
from Beijing to European expectations of reci-
procity of access to the Chinese market through 
liberalisation15. In connection with this, Brussels 
has adopted a more assertive posture towards 
China, by undertaking activities such as: 
- the imposition of duties on Chinese steel; 
- refusing to grant China market economy 
status within the WTO (which would limit the 
EU’s ability to impose anti-dumping duties on 
imports from China); 
- starting the process of revising EU mech-
anisms to block direct foreign investments 
aimed at stemming the outflow of European 
technology to China;
- putting pressure on Beijing to apply Euro-
pean standards and norms for financing and 
constructing infrastructure within the frame-
work of the Chinese Belt & Road Initiative, 
both in Central & Eastern Europe and the 
Eurasian states outside the EU16. 
The result of this year’s EU-China summit was 
a resumption of dialogue. The meeting ended 
with a joint statement for the first time in two 
years; the two sides also moved closer togeth-
er on global and sectoral issues. Support was 
declared for the maintenance of the nucle-
ar agreement with Iran and the Paris climate 
15 The European demands, repeated for years, relate to the 
reduction of trade barriers (including numerous non-tar-
iff barriers), reducing restrictions on foreign investors in 
China, and guaranteeing the protection of their intellec-
tual property. In a number of strategic sectors, the ac-
quisition of Chinese companies by foreign entities is im-
possible, and greenfield projects require the sharing of 
technology with the Chinese partner. The Chinese state 
also provides significant support to Chinese businesses 
in sectors considered as strategic.
16 During the prestigious first Road & Belt Forum in May 
2017, EC representatives were able to persuade most EU 
countries not to sign the joint declaration on the financ-
ing of infrastructure, citing a lack of transparency and 
attention to sustainable development in the Chinese 
credit model.
China may be continuing its tactic of ‘di-
vide and conquer’ in Europe, in an attempt 
to use bilateral dialogue with Germany as 
the main instrument to influence the EU’s 
policy on trade.
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declaration, as well as cooperation on the 
denuclearisation of North Korea. A joint work-
ing group, led by the Chinese deputy prime 
minister Liu He and the Deputy Head of the 
EC Jyrki Katainen, will develop a common 
proposal for the reform of the World Trade 
Organisation. Progress was also announced 
in the negotiations concerning geographi-
cal indicators on products designed to pro-
vide better protection for European food 
producers in China, and on accelerating a bi-
lateral investment agreement (BIT) between 
China and the EU. Of importance from the point 
of view of Central and Eastern Europe was the 
publication of a common list of projects with-
in the framework of the EU-China Connectivity 
Platform, including 10 infrastructure projects in 
the region which would be carried out with the 
participation of China, under the auspices of 
and covered by EU law.
However, China failed to obtain a clear state-
ment from the EU within the context of a pos-
sible agreement regarding President Trump’s 
policy. Both sides have declared their joint sup-
port for the WTO’s multilateral trade rules and 
the containment of unilateralism, although EU 
officials sought to tone down the anti-Amer-
ican rhetoric, inviting the United States and 
Russia among others to cooperate. The WTO 
reform plan is still at a very general level, and 
during the summit the President of the Europe-
an Council, Donald Tusk, said that such reform 
should proceed in the direction of regulating 
issues such as state subsidies, protecting intel-
lectual property and transfers of technology by 
force. This indicates that the EU will continue 
to put pressure on China in terms of opening 
up its domestic market and creating equal con-
ditions for competition; this position is also in 
line with the United States’ principal demands 
regarding China.
Would the EU join China’s coalition 
against Trump?
President Trump’s trade policy is becoming a key 
condition defining the dynamics of the EU-Chi-
na relationship. It is forcing Beijing to offer con-
cessions to its main partners in Europe and to 
undertake dialogue on matters which it finds 
inconvenient. So far, the list of specific propos-
als China has offered is relatively small, and in 
reality July’s diplomatic offensive in Europe was 
based on sounding out the expectations of its 
partners in the EU and opening up channels of 
dialogue. This may be connected with the cur-
rent early stage of the Chinese-American trade 
war (which currently involves only a little over 
10% of both countries’ trade). If the US follows 
through on its threats (including the declared 
second round of tariffs on US$200 billion of Chi-
nese exports), we should expect China to make 
further offers and express a greater willingness 
to deepen the dialogue. However, any systemic 
changes and a greater opening-up by China to 
European companies will depend on whether 
the EU can maintain a consistent position, and 
on individual member states not reducing the 
pressure on Beijing in exchange for bilateral 
privileges. So far, the largest number of China’s 
specific concessions has been aimed at Berlin. 
This indicates that China may be continuing 
its tactic of ‘divide and conquer’ in Europe, in 
an attempt to use bilateral dialogue with Ger-
many as the main instrument to influence the 
EU’s policy on trade. This has been aided by 
a partial convergence of interests in relation to 
Trump’s policy. Berlin, which has been the sub-
ject of criticism by the US President, is worried 
that if the US policy proves to be an effective 
President Trump’s trade policy is forcing 
Beijing to offer concessions to its main 
partners in Europe and undertake dialogue 
on matters which it finds inconvenient.
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mechanism to level off China’s trade surplus, 
Germany, which also has a trade surplus with 
the United States, may become another victim 
of these methods. 
If Trump’s pressure on China rises, Beijing 
will expect more unambiguous support from 
Europe in its dispute with the United States. 
This puts the EU in a dilemma. Even if the spi-
ral of imposing further tariffs only rises be-
tween China and the US alone, it is the pro-
duction plants of European firms located in 
both countries which would lose out, no less 
than their American and Chinese partners. It 
would hit especially hard at the business mod-
els of the most globalised European companies, 
which have plants around the world. Another 
side-effect of high tariffs on China could be the 
flooding of the EU market with Chinese prod-
ucts, whose sales on the US market would cease 
to be viable, for example in the case of steel.
On the other hand, the EU member states 
share basically all the United States’ demands 
concerning China’s protectionist actions, as 
they can see that the policy of soft pressure on 
Beijing has not brought the desired results. 
Trump’s increase of pressure on China has 
prompted the authorities in Beijing to make 
almost immediate concessions and declare 
their readiness to liberalise market access, 
which Brussels has been requesting for years. 
In addition, the EU will itself be looking for an 
agreement with Washington, especially on the 
issue of possible customs tariffs on cars, and 
so it does not want to give the impression of 
unambiguously supporting China’s demands in 
a confrontation with the United States.
Colliding head-on with the United States would 
also risk a serious political crisis within the EU. 
The US is not only an important partner in the 
field of economy, but is also the guarantor of 
European security. The EU’s interests are too di-
vergent for it to be become a third geopolitical 
actor which could tip the balance in favour of 
one side in a dispute between Washington and 
Beijing. We should therefore expect that the 
EU will be unable to tip the scales in a possi-
ble trade conflict between the US and China, 
but will instead choose a path of slaloming be-
tween the two parties. One example of this is 
the EU’s signing of an economic partnership 
agreement with Japan, whose details took six 
months to negotiate, even though previously 
the parties had been unable to reach an agree-
ment for several years. However, if it becomes 
impossible to continue this strategy and it be-
comes necessary to choose one of the parties 
to the dispute, Brussels will rather support the 
interests of the US. Otherwise, the EU would 
be beset by very strong divisions which could 
threaten its coherence.
